Employee Relation Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Employee Relation - Essay Example For instance, this strategy has attracted over 16% of professionals working in the private sector in 2014. Unions have developed several strategies for the attraction of new membership. One of the strategies is the development of a constant communication with the workers. This is one of the core activities adopted by trade unions. They maintain constant contacts with the members, especially in their workplaces. This helps in the attraction of new members through an assurance of the protection of their rights. The communication also aids in the creation of internal debates among the workers and the unions, for the identification of areas that are prone to limitations in terms of membership acquisition. These strategies have shaped the trade unions in relation to an increase in the membership base. In addition, different unions have created special committees that have specific roles that relates to a particular set of workers. For instance, most of the unions have created the women’s department that ensures the female workers of their representation and equal rights in the unions. This strategy has led to the implementation of particular processes for increased membership (Waddington, 2003). It also assumes that for it to succeed in attracting new members, the committees created need to address the issues of the particular groups. This has occurred in several unions that have considered the interests of the workers such as the improvement of their working conditions. The ultimate outcome is that the unions that have considered such interests have registered quite a huge number of new members. Finally, unions have developed interesting strategies that appeal to younger workers to persuade them into the membership (Hollinshead et al. 2003). For instance, the unions organize certain events, debates, and seminars that appeal

Explaining Electoral Volatility In Latin America Politics Essay

Explaining Electoral Volatility In Latin America Politics Essay Abstract Many existing explanations of electoral volatility in Latin America have been tested at the country level, but they are largely untested at the individual party level. In this paper, I apply a hierarchical linear model (HLM) to test various explanations of electoral volatility on data of 128 parties in the lower house elections of 18 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2011. My most important finding pertains to the conditional effect of a partys incumbency status on electoral volatility. First, the results show that the effect of party age on reducing electoral volatility is stronger for incumbent parties. Second, an incumbent party has a lower level of electoral volatility than opposition parties during periods of stronger economic performance. Last, while an irregular alteration of political institutions is hypothesized to increase the level of volatility for all the parties in a country, the effect is more significant for the incumbent party. Explaining Electoral Volatility in Latin America: Evidence at the Party Level Introduction Concerns with party system institutionalization and its consequences in developing countries have grown in the past decade. Extant literature underscores that political parties play an important role in linking diverse social forces with democratic institutions, channeling societal demands, managing sociopolitical conflicts, holding government officials accountable to the electorate, and legitimizing the regime (Dix 1992; Sartori 1968; Schattschneider 1942). In this sense, political parties with stable and consistent support across elections not only ensure their long-term survival, but also help institutionalize the party system. A stable and institutionalized party system fosters more effective programmatic representation (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 157) and facilitates the institutionalization of political uncertainty (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). In contrast, a democratic country with a poorly institutionalized party system where electoral volatility is very high tends to produce populist leaders and discourage the incumbent party from making long-term policy commitments (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).  [1]   In comparison to Western Europe and the United States, the level of electoral volatility is exceptionally high in Latin America (Payne et al. 2002). In the 1990s, the overall electoral volatility in this region was about twice that in the developed world (Roberts and Wibbels 1999). Weak partisan identities of voters, rapid voting choice changes, and unpredictable election campaigns are prevalent political characteristics in this region (Baker, Ames, and Renno 2006), but what explains the variation in electoral volatility in Latin America? Previous work on electoral volatility has provided explanations about political institutions, national economic performance, social cleavages, ethnic heterogeneity, and historical factors (Hicken and Kuhonta 2011; Madrid 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Tavits 2005). These explanations have been tested at the country level, but they are largely untested at the individual party level, even though that is the level at which th e effects of certain relevant explanatory factors are expected to work. Why do some parties have higher levels of electoral volatility than others? Do factors cause electoral volatility at the country level have the same impact on party level volatility? Does the incumbent party enjoy certain advantages that opposition parties do not have to secure electoral stability? This paper aims to address these questions by examining electoral evidence at the party level in Latin America. I generated a value of electoral volatility for each party between elections by performing Morgenstern and Potthoffs (2005) components-of-variance model on an original dataset of lower house electoral results at the district level for 128 parties in 18 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2011. I first demonstrate that the patterns of electoral volatility at the party-level differ from that at the country level. I then apply a hierarchical linear model (HLM) to test country-level, party-level, and cross-level hypotheses regarding why some parties are more electorally volatile th an others. The most important result of this study is that the incumbent parties and opposition parties have different behavioral patterns under certain conditions. Specifically, I find that a better national economic performance helps the incumbent party, rather than every party in the country, to reduce the level of electoral volatility. Moreover, I demonstrate that an irregular institutional change greatly increases the incumbent partys electoral volatility, rather than that of every party in the country. At the party level, I find that the effect of a partys incumbency status is contingent on certain party-specific characteristics. The results show that incumbent parties that were founded in earlier periods are generally less volatile than younger incumbent parties. These findings are robust after controlling for a variety of other explanatory factors that will affect electoral volatility, using a different sample of parties, or adopting a different model specification. In sum, relative to previous work, this study is distinctive in that it uncovers patterns of electoral volatility and provides a better understanding of the dynamics of party politics in new democracies. Why Study Party-level Electoral Volatility? I focus on party volatility in this paper, and I argue that examining electoral volatility at the party level facilitates a better understanding of the patterns of party development. In general, electoral volatility refers to the phenomenon in which voters switch voting choice in consecutive elections. Many previous have used the Pedersen Index  [2]  (Pedersen 1983) to operationalize the level of party system electoral volatility (Birch 2003; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Mainwaring 1999; Roberts and Wibbels 1999). However, as Mair (1997, 66) argues, aggregate volatility measurement such as the Pedersen Index explains little about the persistence or decay of political cleavages. Mainwaring et al. (2010) argue that the Pedersen Index fails to distinguish between the volatility caused by vote switches from one party to the other and the volatility caused by the entry and exit of parties from the political system. Morgenstern and Potthoffs (2005, 30) critique is that the Pedersen Index fails to account for the relative electoral movement of individual parties within the system; in other words, the Pedersen Index tells nothing about which party is more volatile than the others. This problematic feature may produce mistaken if not biased inferences. For instance, although the Pedersen Index indicates that Argentinas mean party system institutionalization is lower than that of Brazil and Mexico from the 1980s to the 2000s (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 159), it does not indicate that Argentinas electoral volatility is largely a result of the crisis of the Unià ³n Cà ­vica Radical (UCR) instead of the incumbent Partido Justicialista (PJ) (Levitsky 1998, 461). In short, aggregate electoral volatility is likely to mask patterns of party-level electoral volatility. The level of electoral volatility matters for a party because it is an important indicator of a partys long-term survival. Party volatility is also an indicator of party institutionalization (Dalton and Weldon 2007; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). According to Janda (1980, 26-7), an institutionalized party should have stable partisan support because it can secure stable representation by building strong and regular societal ties with the electorate. A more institutionalized party should have a lower level of electoral volatility and a higher probability to survive over time, and it also implies that this party has a stable, routinized organizational structure and/or supporters with strong partisanship (Levitsky 1998). As Randall and Svà ¥sand (2002) contend, a high level of party system institutionalization does not necessarily indicate that all the parties within the system have an equally high level of party institutionalization. In other words, it is not necessarily the case that a high level of country volatility implies that all the parties in this country are equally volatile between elections. Therefore, a more important research question needs to be addressed: Is a partys electoral volatility determined by country-level factors, features of the party, or both? In the next section, I will discuss and propose testable hypotheses for the empirical analyses. Explaining Party Volatility Party volatility considers the degree to which a partys average vote is stable across two consecutive elections. Previous studies about country-level electoral volatility have considered national economic performance, political institutions, and social structural factors as three competing theoretical explanations of electoral volatility. However, some of the tested hypotheses, particularly those regarding economic voting and institutional theories, are actually derived from behavioral patterns of individual parties. Thus, these hypotheses should be tested at a more appropriate level, that is, the party level. Unlike previous studies of electoral volatility that focus on country-level explanations, this paper focuses on explaining party-level volatility, and such a research design facilitates the testing of party-level, country-level, and cross-level hypotheses. In particular, I argue that the behavior of the incumbent party is different from opposition parties. Moreover, I contend that the effect of a partys incumbency status is contingent on certain factors. Next, I will discuss various competing theoretical arguments about party electoral volatility at different analytical levels. Party Age and Incumbency Status Previous studies have discussed how time affects electoral volatility at the country level. Roberts and Wibbels (1999) argue that an older system is likely to have deeper and stronger historical roots in society than younger ones. Therefore, the level of electoral volatility will decrease with the age of a party system. Adopting a similar approach, Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) propose a democratization timing explanation for why some party systems are more stable than others. The authors demonstrate that the level of democratic governance voters have experienced will affect the level of electoral volatility. In other words, what matters for accounting for stabilization of party competition is the timing when democracy began in the country. Voters in democracies that were created in earlier periods had stronger attachments to parties, so that can help forge stable patterns of party competition (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 163). In contrast, political elites in new democracies have less in centive to make efforts in party building, since they tend to depend on mass media and modern campaigns to win the elections. While Mainwaring and Zocos thesis sheds light on the relationship between democratic learning and party system stabilization, it ignores the variation of party age within a country. Clearly, old and young parties can exist in both old and new democracies in Latin America.  [3]  However, Mainwaring and Zocos argument might imply that party volatility will be higher in a newly-founded democracy, regardless of how old a party is in this country. To avoid this problematic inference, a more appropriate research strategy is to test Mainwaring and Zocos argument at the party level. Specifically, if Mainwaring and Zocos argument holds at the party level, we may expect that political parties that were founded in earlier periods will have lower levels of electoral volatility, because their supporters have much stronger partisan attachments than the supporters of younger parties. In contrast, younger parties will have higher levels of electoral volatility because the elites of these parties will have less incentive to delve into party building. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is generated: H1: A party that was founded in earlier periods will have a lower level of electoral volatility than a party that was founded later. The second testable hypothesis of this study is about a partys incumbency status. Some scholars argue that institutions such as states and parties might have their own strategic goals and behave as political actors in their own right (Cox and McCubbins 1993). While parties can be different in terms of various characteristics, whether or not a party is the presidents party is a crucial for explaining differences in party behavior. Incumbency advantage generally implies that incumbents are more likely to win an election than the counterpart nonincumbents (Erikson 1971; Mayhew 1974). Cox and Katz (1997) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997) decomposed the concept of incumbent advantage into three elements: (1) direct officeholder effect, such as opportunities for providing constituency services (Fiorina 1977; King 1991) and using legislative resources such as personal staff for performing casework (Cover and Brumberg 1982); (2) the ability of incumbents to scare off high-quality challengers (Kr asno and Green 1988); and (3) the generally higher quality of the incumbents due to their experiences and campaign skills (Fenno 1978). The literature on incumbent advantage provides useful insights for this study. Since presidency is often considered as an extraordinarily important political institution in Latin America (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997), it is expected that the presidents party has advantages that opposition parties do not have. In particular, the incumbent party is more likely to receive access to public funds and more capable in allocating targeted resources to secure its survival (Calvo and Murillo 2004). Although being an incumbent party does not necessarily indicate a higher probability of winning an election in the contemporary Latin American context, it is reasonable to expect that an incumbent party should have a more stable electoral performance than opposition parties. However, an incumbent party in a new democracy might not have a stable electoral performance under certain circumstances. The experience in Latin America suggests that, when a country is governed by a new party, the patterns of electoral competition will become more unstable. In Peru, Alberto Fujimoris self-coup in 1992 and the adoption of a new constitution in 1993 helped to dramatically increase votes for the incumbent Cambio 90 in the 1995 election. However, Fujimoris 40-point plunge in public approval ratings in mid-1997 (Roberts and Wibbels 1999, 586), and the demise of Fujimoris party in the 2000 and 2001 elections, not only suggest a high level of unpopularity of Fujimoris neoliberal structural reforms, but also a high level of fluid electoral preference when a country is governed by a new party. Although the effect of a partys incumbency status on party electoral volatility might not be clear, it is possible that this effect is conditional on other factors. In particular, if party age helps to reduce electoral volatility, it then makes sense that the effect should be stronger for the incumbent party. An incumbent party with an older age suggests that it not only has more access to use state resources to enhance its electoral competitiveness, but it also has stronger party organizations and members. Put differently, an older incumbent party might have a lower level of electoral volatility than a young incumbent party. Therefore, I generate the following hypothesis: H2: The effect of party age on reducing electoral volatility is stronger for an incumbent party. Incumbency, National Economy, and Institutional Change Besides the party-level hypotheses, I also test cross-level hypotheses to see whether the effect of a partys incumbency status is contingent on certain country-level factors. The first cross-level explanation concerns the interaction between incumbency and economy. Economic voting theory argues that some citizens will respond to the waxing and waning of the economy by shifting their votes to reward or punish incumbent parties and officeholders (Lewis-Beck 1988). In other words, electoral volatility is driven by voters retrospective evaluations of economic performance of the incumbent government. More specifically, economic hardship can be expected to increase electoral volatility by undermining the loyalties and support for the incumbent party and by increasing the opposition parties votes. By contrast, in a better economic climate, one would expect that people prefer to maintain the status quo by continuing to support the incumbent party so that electoral volatility decreases. The proposition that economic conditions shape election outcomes in democratic countries is robust for studies using individual survey data (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). In contrast, analyses of electoral volatility at the country level find inconsistent evidence about economic voting. Remmer (1991; 1993) and Madrid (2005) demonstrate that economic performance has a significant impact on the level of electoral volatility in Latin America. The evidence in advanced democracies also shows that economic performance strongly shapes electoral volatility (Bischoff forthcoming). However, recent analyses of new democracies in post-communist Europe (Epperly 2011) and Africa (Ferree 2010) show that economic voting is not a crucial factor in explaining party system volatility. One possible explanation for these inconsistent findings pertains to the appropriateness of the level of analysis. Specifically, since economic voting theory suggests that national economic performance will affect the extent of vote switches between the incumbent party and opposition parties between elections, it is more appropriate and necessary to test this argument at the party level. If the economic voting argument holds, it is expected that the incumbent party will have a lower electoral volatility than opposition parties when the economic performance is better. Conversely, the incumbent party is expected to have a higher electoral volatility than the opposition parties when the economy is in crisis. Based on the logic of economic voting, I propose the following economic voting hypothesis on party volatility: H3: The incumbent party will have a lower level of electoral volatility than opposition parties when the national economy is better. The second cross-level explanation is about the interaction between incumbency and institutional change. As the literature of rational choice institutionalism indicates, institutions matter because political actors behavior is driven mainly by a strategic calculus facing the limitation and opportunities that particular institutional or organizational settings offer (Hall and Taylor 1996). The stable persistence of political institutions that regulate electoral competition helps political parties to socialize their voters over time, and upholds the legitimacy of a democratic regime. Therefore, a fundamental alteration or an irregular discontinuity in important political institutions is expected to have a shock effect on the competitive equilibrium of elections. Based on evidence from Latin American countries, Roberts and Wibbels (1999) and Madrid (2005) find that the electoral dynamics of a party system is greatly altered by the adoption of a new constitution, a significant enfranchisement, and/or irregular changes in the executive branch such as a presidential self-coup (autogolpe), or a forced resignation of the president. Although these dramatic and irregular alterations of existing institutions are found to increase electoral volatility at the country level, it makes sense that such shocks should also influence party-level electoral volatility. In particular, it is expected that such irregular institutional changes will increase the volatility of the incumbent party to a greater extent. Recent political developments in Latin America suggest that this hypothesis is reasonable. For instance, in Ecuador the adoption of a new constitution in 2008 helped the incumbent Alianza PAIS increase its level of voter support in the 2009 election. In contrast, irregular removal of presidents also leads to higher electoral volatility for incumbent parties, but in a negative direction. The 2009 Honduran coup dà ©tat with the removal of President Manuel Zelaya made his Partido Liberal de Honduras (PLH) suffer a significant loss in the election at the end of the year. Likewise, the resignation of President Alberto Fujimori in Peru in 2000 also led to an electoral fiasco for the governing Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria. Based on the discussion above, I propose the following hypothesis: H4: The incumbent party will have a higher level of electoral volatility than opposition parties after a shock of an irregular institutional discontinuity. Alternative Explanations of Party Volatility In the empirical analysis, I control for a number of factors that are likely to affect party volatility. At the party level, I control for the size of a party. Party size may influence the stability of electoral performance. The literature of legislators party switching suggests that larger parties in the legislature are more attractive to potential party switchers because they generally have more political influence (Desposato 2006; Heller and Mershon 2008). Therefore, it is possible that a larger party should have a lower level of electoral volatility because it is more attractive to voters who are unwilling to waste their votes on parties with little chance to win the elections. However, it is also possible that smaller parties, especially those with strong regional base, may have low electoral volatility. It is because such parties are able to sustain their survival by securing a small but strong portion of the electorate over time. At the country level, I control for party system fragmentation and ethnic fractionalization. First, according to Pedersen (1983), electoral volatility increases with the number of parties in a system because a greater number of parties suggests that the ideological difference between the parties is small so that voters tend to switch their votes from one party to another between elections. In addition, party system fragmentation will destabilize democratic regimes because it tends to inhibit the construction of inherent legislative majorities (Roberts and Wibbels 1999, 578). Although the hypothesis of party system fragmentation has only been tested at the country level in previous literature (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Birch 2003; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Tavits 2005), it is possible that a fragmented party system will increase electoral volatility at the party level. Another factor that may explain electoral volatility is social cleavages. Madrid (2005, 3) observes that the theoretical expectation that stronger ethnic cleavages help stabilize party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) presumes that parties will provide quality representation of distinct ethnic groups and establish strong linkages with them. In Latin America, this expectation does not hold since most party systems have been composed principally of catch-all parties that have drawn support from a variety of social groups. Because minority ethnic groups would not feel well-represented under this context, the level of electoral volatility tends to be higher since it is unlikely for them to form strong partisan identities (Birnir and Van Cott 2007; Madrid 2005). In short, it is expected that Latin American parties in a highly ethnically fragmented social context will have higher levels of electoral volatility. Last, following previous studies of country-level electoral volatility (Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Tavits 2005; Madrid 2005), I control for a trend factor of party electoral volatility in the model. In a cross-sectional time-series design, Trend controls for the potential problem of spurious correlation when the values of the dependent variable and the independent variables vary independently but in a consistent direction over time. Measurement and Data The unit of analysis in this research is party-elections-country (e.g. Partido dos Trabalhadores 1994-1998 in Brazil). My conception of the dependent variable requires the collection of legislative electoral returns at the district level across time, differentiated by party or party coalition.  [4]  The data include 128 parties in the lower house elections of 18 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2011 (N=527).  [5]  Most district-level electoral data are compiled from official electoral results on the website of each countrys electoral administrative body.  [6]  For the countries that were democratized later in the 1980s or in the 1990s, only the elections after the first democratic election were included.  [7]  Since Latin American countries have different timing of democratization and term length, the data structure of this analysis is unbalanced. A party is selected for the analyses if the party once obtained more than 5% of votes in any legislative election hel d between 1978 and 2011 in the country. This selection criterion ensures the inclusion of a diversity of parties. To generate the value of party volatility, I adopted Morgenstern and Potthoffs (2005) components-of-variance model on district-level data between two consecutive legislative elections held within the same constituency border.  [8]  One major advantage of this components-of-variance model is that it simultaneously takes into account various features of a partys electoral performance when generating the value of party volatility. Specifically, Morgenstern and Potthoffs model enables the calculation of three components of a partys vote share in a particular election: volatility, district heterogeneity, and local vote. While Morgenstern and his colleagues have used the latter two components for the research about party nationalization (Morgenstern and Swindle 2005; Morgenstern, Swindle, and Castagnola 2009), I focus on the first component, i.e., party electoral volatility, in this paper. The volatility score assigned for each observation is a continuous variable with values that rang e from 0 to à ¢Ã‹â€ Ã… ¾, where higher numbers indicate a higher level of electoral volatility for the party. My primary party-level independent variables are Incumbency, Party age, and Incumbency*Party age. Incumbency is a dichotomous variable, measuring whether a party was the presidents party in two consecutive elections. Following Mainwaring and Zoco (2007), I measure Party age as the natural log of the number of years from the year when the party was officially founded to the year of 2011. The value of this variable does not vary over time, but is constant for all electoral periods for a given party. The interaction term, Incumbency*Party age, examines whether the effect of a partys age on volatility is contingent on a partys incumbency status. To test the economic voting hypothesis, I use two economic indicators: GDP growtht1 and Inflationt1.  [9]  GDP growtht1 is lagged by one year to capture the short term economic impact on volatility. Inflation rate is operationalized as the logged value of the inflation rate for the year before the election year. The logged inflation rate is used to prevent cases of hyperinflation from skewing the results.  [10]  To test whether the effect of the national economy on party volatility is conditional on a partys incumbency status, I include two interaction terms: Incumbency*GDP growtht1 and Incumbency*Inflationt1. In addition, to test whether a shock of institutional alteration will affect the incumbent party to a greater extent, I include two variables: Institutional discontinuity and Incumbency*Institutional discontinuity. I use the index constructed by Roberts and Wibbels (1999) to measure institutional discontinuity. The index ranges from 0 to 3, assigning one point to each of the following types of discontinuities: the adoption of a new constitution; an increase in voter turnout of more than 25 percent due to the enfranchisement of new voters; and an irregular change in executive authority, including a presidential self-coup (autogolpe), a forced resignation of the president, the ouster of the president due to impeachment, or a failed coup dà ©tat attempt when the president was temporarily ousted from the office.  [11]   Finally, I control for several party-level and country-level variables in the model. Party size is measured as the vote share of the party in the previous election.  [12]  Party system fragmentationt1 is measured as the index of the effective number of parties (ENP) (Laakso and Taagepera 1979), lagged by one election.  [13]  Ethnic Fragmentation is measured as Fearons (2003) ethnic fractionalization index. Last, the variable Trend is measured as the number of years since the first election in which a party participated. Estimation Techniques To test the hypotheses about party-level electoral volatility, I employ a hierarchical linear model (HLM) on my three-level data. The three-level model is specified as a level-1 submodel that describes how each party changes over time, a level-2 submodel that describes how these changes differ across parties, and a level-3 model that describes how parties and changes differ across countries. An attractive feature of a multilevel models is its ability to model cross-level interactions in the estimation. Another important advantage of the HLM approach is being able to account for both fixed effects and random effects. In this study, the fixed-effects coefficients and parameters of the HLM estimate a regression line that describes the sample of parties as a whole, while the random-effect parameters reflect variation across parties and variation across countries. Application of the HLM in this study will specify three different levels of analysis: The level-1 submodel represents the rela tionship of time-varying characteristics on party volatility, the level-2 model will incorporate party-level effects that are fixed over time, and level-3 will introduce country-level effects that are fixed over time. I estimate the model using restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML). In contrast to full MLE estimation, REML takes into account the degrees of freedom consumed by estimation of the fixed effects by eliminating fixed effects from the likelihood fu

21st Century :: essays research papers

In A Brief History of Time by Stephen Hawking There were very many interesting theories and facts that were brought up about physics. A couple of these theories and fact help lead me to deciding on my opinion about the future of physics in the 21st century. My opinion is that in the 21st century a couple of things will happen in the way of physics. First I think scientist will continue work on old experiments and make new theories. Another one of my thought are that scientist will prove previous theories wrong. The continuation of scientist finding out more theories and furthering previous experiment is a big possibility. This is likely to happen because since about 200 BC scientist and philosophers have been making theories about Earth and how things on Earth work as well as in the Universe. One of the earliest examples of these theories was Aristotle. Aristotle thought that the Earth was stationary and that the sun, the moon, the planets and the stars moved in circular orbits around the earth. Then in the 2nd century ad , Ptolemy made a model which elaborated the theory made by Aristotle. In his model "The earth stood at the center, surrounded by eight spheres that carried the moon, the sun, the stars and the 5 planets known at the time. Years and years after all these first theories of how the universe was setup scientist found that all the planets revolve around the sun. This is an example of how was seems so simple now like how the planets work was so complicated to our predecesso rs, and as for what I think, what we find so complicated right now will be so simple in later decades. I also believe that in the 21st century scientist will prove that previous theories that were made by scientist are false. Stephen Hawking sums this up by saying "At the beginning of this century, it was thought that everything could be explained in terms of properties and continues matter which shows how quickly things can change in the world of science, because of this Max Baron put it this way "it is possible for physics as we know it to be over in six months" because theories change so quickly that physics may not be where it is now in six months.

Breast Reduction

The Pros and Cons of a Breast Reduction Savanna Elevate Hudson Instructor: Pamela Congealed ENG 121 English Composition I July 29, 2014 The decision to have a breast reduction surgery came after years of continuous back pain throughout my life. My experience has been a real Journey in researching the right doctor and asking the right questions for this type of surgery. My Journey began in 2012 after many attempts to lose weight. I began doing several exercises with hope that my breast would firm up and I would see a change see a change with my weight.After seeing no changes I decided to take another route. I tried many different diets, personal trainers, meal plans and body wrap suits. With that I tried I still say no results. Ultimately I decided that I should start looking into breast reduction surgery to see if it was a good fit for me. In 2014 after during all my research I find a surgeon and had my consultation. I was made aware of financial obligation which was ten-thousand dol lars after discussing it with my significant other I then decided to have the surgery.I was made aware of the complications that old come from having this particular surgery. The complications could range from bleeding during surgery, possible of a stroke, heart attack, are even blood clotting. After finding the right doctor and discussing all the pros and cons then, I decided that it would be well worth the risk to have the surgery. I express to the surgery I wanted my current double H -bra size reduce c-cup. A week before surgery I completed my pre-pop and was cleared for surgery due to all labs being normal. The surgery was approximately three hours longs.I was immediately after surgery I was admitted into the hospital due to my inability to fully wake after the surgery. The next morning following surgery I waken with severe pain, swelling, and soreness. I had bandage wrapped around my entire breast area with drainage tubes on the left and right side. I was hospitalized for two d ays and unable to move due excruciating pain. After two days of being hospitalized I was being discharge and I received my aftercare instructions. My instructions were a bit rigorous because I had to remember several things.These things included getting use to wearing a bra purport, remembering to take my medications, applying medicated cream to the incision creams, and continuing to drain my breast pumps and keep them clean after showering. My significant other helps me with all my personal needs. He helped me bathes, put on my clothes and shoes, and even feed me. I needed help because I was not able to fend for myself. After a week I had my first doctor visit sense surgery, and my bandages were removed as well as the tubs. I didn't know whether to be happy or cry when I looked at my scars in the mirror.I observed the incision from the right underarm to my left underarm. I was also shown where both nipples were removed and replaced by being sewn back on. The doctor also told me he removed five pound of breast tissue from each breast. My doctor assured me that the swelling, drainage and pain would subside overtime. He also went over a few restriction that I had to follow while recover at home. I couldn't lift my arms over my head, no bending are stretching, no exercising, and no other strenuous activities. I would have three- four doctors visit before I would be able to return to work.I was out from work for eight week from the surgery. He also advised that the full recovery time could take up to one- two years. Since the reduction I went from a double H cup too C-cup and had to buy new clothes. I am now able to shop at my favorite which sis Victoria Secret. I really enjoy wearing tank tops, sun dresses, and sleeves shirts. Crop tops and sports bras. In going through with the surgery, it has been the greatest thing I could've done. I am happier than Vive been in years, and my health overall is excellent. Life as I know it now is awesome.It is a great feeling t o be able to run and play with the kids and not become short of breath, be able to function daily without any back pain, and most importantly wear clothing that looks great on me. I am no longer on a diet every other week. I have changed the way I eat, and Vive incorporated exercising, and increased my water intake for myself and my family as well. I learned how to buy the right foods, and how to eat them properly to ensure that it would help me burn calories. I would give word of advice to anyone that is thinking about having this surgery.I would advise them to do extensive research on the doctors, always ask lots of questions and remember that no question is a dumb question. They're many research tools available such as you-tube, which how the actual footage of the procedure and Google is helpful information on specialist and procedure. I would also make sure that you truly know what the complications are, and how it will change your life before you decide to do it. I suggest that you have a good support system to get you through your recovery. I truly thank my significant other for all his purport and encouragement from the beginning to the end as well other family members.It's also important to do your research on the surgery because it range anywhere from five thousand are more. I also make sure you're able to be out from work least eight weeks for this type for surgery. Overall, I would not recommend this major surgery to anyone if there are other options available. After listening to several women that had this procedure done, and comparing and contrasting I am proud to say that I could not be happier by having had this surgery. This has truly been a life changing event in my life.

Play Review Example: To Kill a Mockingbird Essay

For the play critique assignment, I saw To Kill a Mockingbird on October seventh. The play was performed at the Second Space Theatre and was produced by the Good Company Players with The Dramatic Publishing Company. I have read the book which the play was based on, so I was exposed to the story line prior to having seen the play. Based on my knowledge of the text by Harper Lee, I was able to distinguish distinct differences between the book and the play, which I feel affected my reaction to the script. For example, the script left out when Scout and Jem Finch, and Dill were snooping around the Radley house and had to flee the yard through a break in the fence, when Nathan Radley came outside to investigate the noise they were making. This caused Jem’s pants to get caught, forcing him to take them off and return to retrieve them later that night. I feel leaving this out lessens the impact of Nathan’s character, which already has such a small part in the story. Nathan’s character is lessened because leaving this out causes his menacing demeanor to be portrayed as rude in his other scenes. Also, this adaptation of the play did not include when Miss Maudie’s house caught on fire and Boo Radley comes out for the first time to wrap a blanket around Scout and Jem, without anyone noticing. This choice places less of an impact and underlying focus on Boo’s role, which may have left some viewers confused as to why he was so mysterious throughout the play and suddenly a key character in the end. However, I did enjoy the fact that the script stayed true to the text in the lines of Older Scout, as well as the emphasis they put on the lightheartedness of Dill. Based on the stage performance I viewed on October 7, 2012, I believe most of the actors did very well. For example, Scout, played by Bailey Short, Jem, played by Colin Clark-Bracewell, and Dill, played by Marty Margolin, were excellent, especially considering their young age. All three were very professional in all aspects of their performance, as proven by the fact they stayed completely in character and didn’t skip a beat when an audience member’s phone screeched out several loud rings, during their opening lines. In the beginning of the play, when aspects of the exposition were being introduced, Scout appeared on stage, and in her first line you could tell she was a bit nervous. As the play progressed though, she became more comfortable and it was clear she was enjoying herself. Chris Carsten, who played Atticus Finch, did an amazing job on portraying the role of Scout and Jem’s father. He truly became Atticus and made it easier for the rest of the cast to play off of each other’s emotions. For example, when Walter Cunningham, played by Mark McKeon, gives Atticus a sack of food as payment for his entailment and Atticus assures him that he has paid him plenty. Walter Cunningham is a man of limited means, seeing as he is a struggling farmer, and has paid in other ways besides money; he had left food or firewood at Atticus’ door many times and Atticus reassures him, in a polite, non condescending tone, that his debt has been paid off. Immediately, this eases Mr. Cunningham’s sense of guilt and obligation, which can be seen through his facial expressions. Everyone’s southern accents were uncannily authentic. However, I did not think Alexis Powell, Mrs. Robinson, and Colby Priest, the Robinson’s son, did very well. Their performance was not realistic. Though they had very little lines, their acting seemed a bit forced and maybe even amateurish. For example, when they were supposed to be grieving the loss of Mr. Robinson their expressions did not convey the emotion of sadness. I thought the play was directed quite well. Considering the small stage the actors had to work with, they truly took advantage of every inch of it. As reflected by the performance, the director, Karan Johnson, drilled into the actors the importance of stage use. The cast definitely utilized the small area by engaging with the audience. They got up close and personal by standing very close to the first row of seats, in almost every scene. The blocking instructions from the director made the performance true to the script. It was relaxed, which fit the play considering it took place in Maycomb, Alabama. For example, the children in the play, as well as the adult men, had their hands in their pockets while speaking to each other, and any other time they were not using them. Every character walked slowly and only ever moved faster when they were running, like during the scene where Jem is dared by Dill to touch the porch of the Radley house. I particularly enjoyed whenever Scout, Jem, and Dill were up to something sneaky and they would look stage left and stage right in anticipation of being caught. The director chose the cast very well. All of the actors fed off of each other’s’ energy, which added to the entire performance. The cast genuinely appeared to be having fun and loved what they were doing. It was like they were a family. On the other hand, I do think the parts of Mrs. Robinson and the Robinson’s son could have been better cast. Compared to the other cast members, they both seemed awkward and inexperienced, but I respect the fact that they performed to the best of their ability. Because of the small stage, the sets were very limited. The sets were very small and only changed once, when they were doing the courtroom scene. Despite that restriction, they made necessary accommodations and it did not take away from the play. I found the use of lighting very efficient. For example, whenever Jean Louise Finch, the older version of Scout, was speaking in her reflective tone, there was a spotlight on her and the rest of the stage’s lights were dimmed. This added to the dramatic tone of the scene. The use of sound effects, such as when a car was approaching or when a gun was shot, made the play more realistic. All of the costumes stayed true to the time era and the makeup was coordinated with the outfit. The actor’s costumes also reflected their social class. For example, Calpurnia, the Finch’s housekeeper, was dressed in a basic dress and an apron wherever she went while Miss Maudie, the Finch’s neighbor, was attired in a more fancy dress which was always accompanied with a hat. Atticus always wore a suit which showed his professional side and the children were dressed in clothes that were suitable for playing around. During the courtroom scene, all of the white women wore their Sunday best and had a lot of makeup on to signify that it was a special occasion in Maycomb. My overall reaction to the play was a positive one. I was thoroughly entertained and was pleased with the level of performance. I never found myself bored and my thoughts never trailed off to something other than the play. The rest of the audience’s reaction was also positive, with the exception of a couple behind me who found it acceptable to continually whisper throughout the show. Besides them, people were attentive and were entertained with the drama of the play. People laughed at all of the appropriate moments and gasped during the dramatic ones, such as during the scene when Jem and Scout were attacked by Mr. Ewell. After the play, when the audience was leaving the theatre, words of praise were spoken by everyone around me and I feel the cast truly deserved all of the great things that were being said about their performance.